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G. E. L. Owen, in his infl uential paper “Inherence,” talks of “vink,” a 
name he has created for a particular shade of the color pink, and this 
“vink” serves as an individual in the Aristotelian category of quality. 
Owen was one of the fi rst to aim to discredit the belief that J. L. Ackrill 
and his camp espoused, the belief that Aristotle thought that “general 
attributes are not in individuals, particular attributes are not in more 
than one individual.” I postulate that there is nothing here that does not 
preclude the existence of transferable nonsubstantial particulars, and 
base this view on passages from Aristotle’s Categories and certain ex-
amples found in Ammonius’s commentary and On Colors. Given this, 
a nonsubstantial particular of “vink” would not have to rely on having 
inhered in just one particular body to have existence, however, it would 
have to inhere in at least one particular body.
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G. E. L. Owen, in his infl uential paper “Inherence” (Owen 1965: 97–
105), talks of “vink,” a name he has created for a particular shade of the 
color pink, and this “vink” serves as an individual in the Aristotelian 
category of quality.1 Owen was one of the fi rst to aim to discredit the 
belief that J. L. Ackrill and his camp espoused, the belief that Aristotle 
thought that “general attributes are not in individuals, particular at-
tributes are not in more than one individual” (Owen 1965: 100).
1 “…analogous to Socrates in the category of substances” (Owen 1965: 98). Owen 
replaces the word Aristotle used, leukon, which represents all light colors, with the 
word pink, for no single English equivalent exists for leukon. “Leukon covers all light 
colors as melan covers all dark colors: that is why the commonplace that all colors 
range between or are composed of leukon and melan (Cat. 12a17–19, Phys. 188b3–5, 
DA. 442a12–13) is sense…” (Owen 1965: 98).
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Owen claims that, given Aristotle’s schema, something must contain 
an individual, such as “vink,” if the individual is to exist at all (Owen 
1965: 105). Here “vink” represents a fully determinate universal-type 
color,2 a repeatable entity that could be shared among more than one 
particular body. It is included as an individual by Owen because he 
viewed it as not being “said of” anything else. Michael Frede has offered 
his interpretation by saying that it is a suffi cient condition that an indi-
vidual, such as “vink,” be found in body in general (Frede 1987: 60–61). 
Given both Owen’s and Frede’s interpretations, it could be inferred that 
a color, such as “vink”, would inhere in particular bodies as a universal-
type entity, due to the view that it is able to manifest in a number of 
particular bodies.
Owen’s and Frede’s interpretations are both different than that of J. 
L. Ackrill’s, Michael Wedin’s (Wedin 1993: 163–164) and others’ which 
view an individual as a trope-like, that is non-recurrent, nonsubstan-
tial particular. However, Owen, Frede and Wedin all agree on the in-
terpretation that a quality inhering in a particular body does not entail 
that the quality could not exist without that particular body.
So, a major issue is how, according to Aristotle, a quality is individ-
uated in a particular body; for the color “vink,” this calls into question 
how it is manifested in a particular body, such as me. The question of 
whether or not a particular “vink” is particular insofar that it belongs 
to a particular body goes to the heart of the matter; if the particular 
body stopped existing, would that particular “vink” as well? I believe 
that this would not have to be the case. A relevant passage here is Ar-
istotle’s Categories 1a24–25:
By “in a subject” I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot ex-
ist separately from what it is in.3
Interpreting this passage in the way it appears Frede does produces 
the following:
x is an accident = df there is something, y, such that x is in y, x is not in y as 
a part, and x cannot exist separately from y (Matthews 1989: 96).
I fi nd that there is nothing in this interpretation that does not pre-
clude the existence of transferable nonsubstantial particulars. Given 
that this is the case, a nonsubstantial particular of “vink” would not 
have to rely on having inhered in just one particular body to have exis-
tence, however, it would have to inhere in at least one particular body. 
A possible example of this would be when color from a particular body 
2 Aristotle is not specifi c about whether the general nature of color is that of a 
universal, but it can be inferred, as Owen has, given Aristotle’s general schema of 
universal to particular.
3 There are not too many places in which Aristotle makes a “distinction 
between being in a subject and being said, or predicated, of a subject” (Cat. 
1a20–b9, 2a11–14, 2a27–b6, 2b15–17, 3a7–32, 9b22–24; Postpred. 11b38–12a17, 
14a16–18; Top. 127b1–4). It is typically within these bounds that the whole 
theory of what it means to be “in a subject” is played out in.
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is transferred to another, such as is what happens with color dyeing; a 
similar example comes from Ammonius’s commentary on the Catego-
ries. More on these examples will follow. In my next section, I produce 
the traditional view.
I
Ackrill believed that Aristotle’s notion of color in body was “compressed 
and careless” (Aristotle [Ackrill’s notes] 1963: 83) when Aristotle stated 
that:
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or 
in them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For exam-
ple, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; 
for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predi-
cated of man at all. Again, color is in body and therefore also in individual 
body; were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus 
all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or 
in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be 
impossible for any of the other things to exist.4
Ackrill read this passage from the Categories as stating that color as 
a universal would be found in a particular body. However, he believed 
that Aristotle did not really mean what he wrote there, that is that he 
had mistakenly written it. He further interpreted Aristotle as having 
meant to say that a nonrecurrent “instance” of color would be in and 
dependent on a particular body and that universal color would be in 
and dependent on universal body. Thus, universal color would not be in 
a particular body for it did not depend on it (Aristotle [Ackrill’s notes] 
1963: 83).
So, according to Ackrill’s view, the universal-type “vink” would be 
found in a universal body and could not exist apart from it, and simi-
larly, an instance of the color “vink” would be found in a particular body 
and could not exist apart from that particular body. On this defi ni-
tion, each instance of “vink” would be uniquely associated with a par-
ticular body and transfer of that certain instance to another particular 
body would not be possible, that is, that certain instance was viewed 
as inseparable from the particular body it inhered in. An instance of 
“vink” that had inhered in my sweater thus could not be transferred 
my dress.
Although I agree with Ackrill’s reasoning that universal color would 
not be found in a particular body, I am not convinced that Aristotle had 
Ackrill’s idea of instance in mind.
II
Matthews, in his characterization of Frede’s interpretation of Aristo-
tle’s “in a subject” condition, includes a scenario where a person may 
4 Cat. 2a34–2b6.
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have a grandmother in their class who is not their grandmother, but 
rather the grandmother of another person. In this way it is demon-
strated that not every subject that an accident inheres in is a subject 
that it could not exist without (Matthews 1998: 96).
I agree with Matthew’s characterization of Frede, and I agree with 
both Frede and Matthews, as well as Owen, that universal color would 
still exist even if a particular body, which color had inhered in, had 
ceased to exist. However, I disagree with the notion that color as a 
universal inheres in a particular body. Rather, I postulate a view here 
that universal color inheres in universal body, and particular color in-
heres in particular body as a nonsubstantial particular, in that this 
particular color would not have to rely on just one particular body to 
have existence, that is, it could change subjects.
An example that I present in this section is found in a passage 
in a work entitled On Colors.5 This work had traditionally been at-
tributed to Aristotle but is now often ascribed to Theophrastus (c. 
371—c. 287 BCE), Aristotle’s designated successor at the Lyceum 
(Kuehni and Schwarz 2008: 32), or Strato (c. 335—c. 269 BCE), the 
third director of the Lyceum after Theophrastus’s death. Outside of 
the question of whether Aristotle was the actual writer, it is regard-
ed by many to be Aristotelian in nature (Desclos and Fortenbaugh 
2011: 307, see also Edel 1982: 157 and Thomson and Missner 2000: 7). 
Even so, there are still some issues that need to be addressed when 
applying this example in support of my view that a nonsubstantial 
particular may be capable of transferring from one particular body 
to another.
The example is as follows—with regards to the entire process of 
dyeing, a particular object is moistened or heated and some of the 
color of that object is then transferred to another particular object. 
For a time then, no matter how brief, the color is transported by a 
liquid or by heat to a new particular object. The original particular 
object would continue to exist, with the same type of color or a less 
intense hue of the type of color that had transferred, dependent 
on the particular object’s substance and pore-structure.6 The color 
that has now transferred to another particular object may blend 
into the original color of this object due to this particular object’s 
5 On Colors, 794a16–b10. A part of the pertinent passage from On Colors is:
All dyed things take their color from the dye. Common sources of such 
coloration are the flowers of plants and their roots, bark, wood, leaves, or fruit, 
and again, earth, foam, and inks. Sometimes coloration is due to animal juices 
(e.g., the juice of the purple fish, with which clothes are dyed purple), in other 
cases to wine or smoke, or lye mixture, or to sea-water, as happens, for instance, 
to the hair of marine animals, which is always turned red by the sea. In short, 
anything that has a color of its own may transfer that color to other things, and 
the process is always this, that color leaving one object passes with moisture 
and heat into the pores of another, which on drying takes the hue of the object 
which the color came.
6 This is suggested by On Colors, 794a16–b10.
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substance and pore structure, so it is possible that after dyeing, this 
object may end up with a color that is not the exact color that was 
transferred.7
Notwithstanding, however, it is clear that the color that came from 
one particular object had transferred into another particular object. 
The question is, what is the ontological picture behind this occurrence? 
Has some of the original particular object, the host of the color, been 
transferred with its color to another particular object? Another exam-
ple from a later Greek commentary on the Categories may be useful in 
thinking this through.
The example of dyeing found in the passage from On Colors happens 
to be similar to an example that Ammonius (c. 435/445—c. 517/526 CE) 
had presented in his commentary on the Categories (Matthews 1989: 
91–104). Ammonius’s example had to do with the fragrance of an apple 
and how it appeared to exist separately from the apple. However, ac-
cording to Aristotle, that which is in a subject could not exist sepa-
rately from what it is in. One of Ammonius’s solutions to this puzzle, 
which is a repetition of a solution that had previously been put forth 
by Porphyry (232—309 CE), is that some fragrance of the apple had 
transferred from the apple into the air. This solution, called the “tense 
solution” by John Ellis, “allows particular accidents to migrate to other 
subjects” and maintains “that a particular accident must always be in 
some subject” (Ellis 1990: 291–292). The tense solution, as explained by 
Porphyry and echoed by Ammonius, is:
For neither did he [Aristotle] say, “cannot exist separately from that in 
which it was,” but “cannot exist separately from that in which it is.” For the 
fragrance can be separated from that in which it is, though it is impossible 
[for it] to exist separately on its own, but it either perishes or is transferred 
to another subject. For that it is inconceivable for an accident to exist sepa-
rately on its own, this he indicated, but not that it cannot be separated (Ellis 
1990: 291–292).
Ammonius also adds to this that it is perhaps our sense of smell that 
picks out the fragrance of the apple.
Matthews places more stock in the tense solution than another that 
Ammonius seems to favor (although this may be disputed) (Matthews 
1989: 100; Ellis 1990: 291–302),8 which Ellis calls the “effl uence solu-
tion” (Ellis 1990: 293). The effl uence solution has the fragrance fi rst 
7 On Colors, 794a16–b10.
8 Ammonius never states that he favors the effl uence solution, he just wrote 
more lines about this solution than the tense solution. It may be that he felt he did 
not have to write as much on the tense solution since it was an already established 
and well-known solution. That is, Ammonius may have been listing and explaining 
solutions rather than attempting to provide a point of view on which solution to favor. 
Later medieval solutions move away from the tense solution to more psychological 
solutions, but this may be due to the particular evolution of solutions to the fragrance-
in-apple problem and changes in cultural and scientifi c thought, rather than efforts 
to provide a direct refl ection of what Aristotle might have had in mind as a solution 
during the period in which he lived.
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in the apple, then in bits of the apple that are carried along with fra-
grance into the air.
In this case, the apple, which is the host of the fragrance, somehow 
has a part of itself broken up into bits, with those bits carried into the 
air; this is postulated in order to preserve the view that an accident 
could not exist separately from its particular body. However, as Mat-
thews keenly points out (Matthews 1989: 100), the effl uence solution 
is not the relevant solution to ensure this is the case, for the fragrance 
could indeed exist separately from the particular body of the apple. 
Particular bits of apple separated from a particular apple are like par-
ticular toes separated from a particular man. Particular toes are not 
equivalent to a particular man, and similarly, particular bits of apple 
are not equivalent to a particular apple.
The tense solution allows for a transfer of a particular accident from 
one particular body to another particular body; this solution does not 
appear to allow for the simultaneous sharing of a particular accident 
among two or more particular bodies. The effl uence solution, on my and 
Matthews’s interpretation, allows for a transfer of a particular acci-
dent from one particular body (a particular apple) to a particular entity 
(that is, a particular bit from a particular apple; I am clear not to call 
this a particular body, for it would be hard to imagine a universal bit 
of apple as part of Aristotle’s ontology). Even though the transfer of the 
particular fragrance in the effl uence solution is not due to any action 
on the particular fragrance’s part, rather it is the particular subject 
in which it inheres itself that appears to have actively changed, the 
particular fragrance has nonetheless been transferred. In addition to 
the tense solution, the effl uence solution also does not appear to allow 
for the simultaneous sharing of a particular accident in multiple par-
ticular bodies.
Both the tense solution and the effl uence solution may be seen to 
apply to the “transfer of color by dyeing” example. In the version uti-
lizing the tense solution, the nonsubstantial particular shade of color 
that is transferred from one particular body to another particular body 
is fi rst transferred via some particular moisture or particular heat in 
which the particular color inheres. Then, this particular color is trans-
ferred once more to another particular body, the particular body that 
will be dyed by that particular color.
With the effl uence solution, the nonsubstantial particular shade of 
color which is inhering in the original particular body then inheres in 
bits of the original particular body that have been separated from that 
body, which in turn are situated in some particular moisture or partic-
ular heat. After this, the particular color inhering in particular bits of 
the original particular body is transferred to another particular body. 
Any issues of dye fading or running out of this particular body after the 
dyeing process are not relevant, for in the effl uence solution case, it is 
the transfer of the nonsubstantial particular shade of color between the 
 I. Cronin, On Aristotelian Universals and Individuals 347
original particular body and the bits of the original particular body that 
are important. However, as in the “fragrance-in-apple” example, an is-
sue that may never be resolved is exactly what kind of entity would Ar-
istotle have thought a bit of apple was. Although, it is clear to me and 
others such as Matthews that a particular bit of apple is not equivalent 
to the particular original whole apple it had separated from.
III
Man, the universal, is said of a particular man. On my view, a fully 
determinate, universal-type color, such as “vink”, is said of a nonsub-
stantial particular of “vink”. This nonsubstantial particular of “vink” 
inheres in a particular body and may be transferred. I believe that color 
in general, moreover, is said of any of the determinate, universal-type 
colors that range in shades between leukon, all light colors, and melan, 
all dark colors.
To summarize, I interpret Aristotle to say that without some par-
ticular body or other, there would be no universal body, no color in gen-
eral, and no color in particular. Furthermore, this color in particular 
is a nonsubstantial particular that is capable of being transferred, and 
only a nonsubstantial particular can inhere in some particular body.
In contrast, Wedin interprets Aristotle’s schema as allowing non-
substantial universals to inhere in particular bodies, while also allow-
ing for “the nonrecurrent status of nonsubstantial particulars” (Wedin 
1993: 164). Examples provided by Wedin of these phenomena would 
have been helpful, for it is diffi cult to grasp the dynamics of how they 
could appear in nature, and thus appears far-fetched; as a result, I do 
not believe Wedin’s structure is what Aristotle had in mind. In anoth-
er opposing view, Cresswell theorizes that Aristotle believed that all 
whiteness was only individual whiteness, with no whiteness in general 
existing (Cresswell 1975: 244–245); this view does not seem to fi t with 
Aristotle’s notion of a general ontology.
Conclusion
I have postulated that Aristotle, according to the Categories and bol-
stered by certain examples found in Ammonius’s commentary and 
On Colors, found that universal color inhered in universal body, and 
that colors as nonsubstantial particulars inhered in particular bod-
ies, though not necessarily inhering in any one particular body, and 
furthermore, that colors as nonsubstantial particulars may have the 
capability of transferring from one particular body to another particu-
lar body. So, on my interpretation, the universal-type “vink” would be 
found in universal body, and a nonsubstantial particular “vink” would 
be found in some particular body or other and may have the capability 
to transfer from one particular body to another.
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